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A major revaluation of the constitutional guarantees of the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment has taken place in the past decade
with regard to the rights of the criminal defendant, and many police prac-
tices, once generally accepted, have been held to be unconstitutional. It
is entirely possible that further changes may be forthcoming.
This comment was conceived in order to explore the common police
lineup, with a view toward predicting the outcome of possible constitu-
tional challenges to lineup procedures and incorporating in a Model Lineup
Procedure those steps which, in light of our projections, are necessary
to protect the rights of the individual and at the same time preserve the
lineup as an effective tool for law enforcement.
II. TYPICAL LINEUP PROCEDURES'
The lineup of criminal suspects is a widely used investigative tech-
nique. In practice it is a more or less formal procedure whereby complain-
ing witnesses view persons suspected of committing crimes. Each suspect
is "lined up" as part of a group which may include other suspects in
police custody, prisoners, or police officers dressed in civilian clothing.
In some jurisdictions, suspects' counsel are permitted to be present during
the lineup, while in others, counsel are not admitted, even when a suspect
requests that his attorney be present.
In some cities, lineups are held in specially-designed auditoriums.
These facilities usually include a stage equipped with theatrical lighting
on which participating suspects take their places. In Philadelphia, a glass
partition divides the auditorium section from the stage, and suspects can
neither see the persons who are viewing them nor hear their conversation.
Microphones and speakers allow the voices of the suspects to be heard by
the audience.
1. Much of the information for this survey of lineup procedures was contained
in a memorandum prepared by the Defenders Association of Philadelphia in response
to a request by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d
710 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966). Practices in ten major American
cities were considered in the preparation of this memorandum. See also Wade v.
United States, 358 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1966) ; People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408
P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965), cert. granted sub nom. Gilbert v. California,
384 U.S. 985 (1966).
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In contrast to the formal lineup procedures are the lineups which
are conducted in local police stations by bringing the suspect, along with
several other persons, into a room where he is directly confronted by the
complaining witness. During a typical lineup it is common for the police
to require suspects to move about or to assume a stance which may relate
to an offense. Suspects may also be required to hold certain objects, such
as a gun or flashlight, or to wear various articles of clothing which were
worn by the culprit during the commission of the offense being investi-
gated. The quality of the voice of the suspect may be crucial in the in-
vestigation of certain crimes. In certain cases each person in the lineup
may be required to repeat the exact words which a witness heard used
by the culprit. In other instances only a general voice sample is elicited.
Lineups can also be differentiated according to the procedural stage
at which the police use this investigative technique, vis-a-vis a particular
suspect. Three classifications are apparent: lineups of suspects who have
been arrested, but who have not yet been indicted; lineups of suspects
who are held in the custody of the authorities pending trial; and volun-
tary appearances by suspects who have been released on bail.
Certain aspects of the common lineup procedures briefly sketched
above suggest the possibility of serious constitutional questions arising
in the near future. The following discussion is an attempt to define these
questions and forecast their probable outcome.
III. THE LINEUP AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INcRIMINATION
The United States Supreme Court has not considered the question
of whether a police lineup is per se violative of the fifth amendment pro-
tection against self-incrimination, 2 although it has been declared constitu-
tional in cursory examinations by a few lower courts3 prior to the recent
landmark decisions in the area of criminal procedure.4 These lower court
2. "No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally INBAU, SELF-INCRIMINA-
TION (1950); MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? (1959);
McCORMICK, EVIDENcE 252-90 (1954) ; 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 12-63 (12th
ed. 1955); 8 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2250-84 (McNaughton Rev. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMORE] ; Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimi-
nation Clause, 29 MICH. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930) ; Pittman, The Colonial and Constitu-
tional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L.
REV. 763 (1935).
3. The following quotation exemplifies the cursory treatment given the lineup by
the lower courts: "We find no reason to express a contrary conclusion so far as
relates to the ordinary police lineup which is carried out under conditions which
permit the greatest objectivity of viewing the accused with others who are exhibited
with him." Wade v. United States, 358 F.2d 557, 559 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 35
U.S.L. WEEK 3083 (Sept. 13, 1966). Other cases illustrating this same type of treat-
ment are United States v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 35 U.S.L.
WEEK 3050 (July 26, 1966) ; Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1964) ;
People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963) ; Meriwether
v. State, 63 Ga. App. 667, 11 S.E.2d 816 (1940).
4. In this regard, note the following statement of the Court in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) :
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all
[VOL. 12
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decisions considered only the general constitutionality of the lineup, with-
out discussing the particular procedures employed by various enforcement
agencies. Their value to this discussion is therefore extremely limited.
Judicial investigation of the privilege against self-incrimination in
areas analogous to the lineup, however, has been more thorough. There
are many cases dealing with the propriety of the use of finger prints, blood
tests, handwriting samples and the like as investigative tools." An examina-
tion of these decisions is necessary to a definition of the standards which
courts have employed in applying the privilege.
A. The Fifth Amendment Standards
The opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt v. United States7 is the
authority relied upon by many of the opinions dealing with areas analogous
to the lineup. In that case the defendant in a murder trial was compelled
to try on a blouse which allegedly belonged to him. An attempt was made
to exclude the testimony of a witness to this exhibition on the ground
that the proceeding violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrim-
ination. In refuting this contention Justice Holmes asserted that:
[Tihe prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an ex-
clusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The objec-
tion in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and com-
pare his features with a photograph in proof.8
In 1964, more than 50 years after the Holt decision, the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals declared that the fifth amendment rights of the
accused were not violated by the use of a lineup during the investigative
stage in order to permit witnesses who had previously identified the de-
fendant's photograph to view him personally. Judge Mehaffy stated that:
The mere viewing of a suspect under arrest by eye-witnesses does not
violate the constitutional privilege [self-incrimination] because the
prisoner is not required to be an unwilling witness against himself.
There is a distinction between bodily view and requiring an accused
to testify against himself.9
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed from being compelled toincriminate themselves. We have concluded that without proper safeguards the
process of incustody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime con-
tains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so
freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately
and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be
fully honored.
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) ; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964).
5. See Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1964).
6. For a compilation of cases in these areas see 8 WirMORE § 2265.
7. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
8. Id. at 252-53.
9. Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 1964).
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The use of the defendant's fingerprints, palmprints, or footprints has been
universally held not to violate the privilege against self-incrimination
when these prints are taken voluntarily.10 In most cases the same result
is reached even though the prints have been obtained through coercion."
In addition to the reasoning advanced in the physical exhibition de-
cisions, it is evident that the practical necessities of law enforcement have
had an important influence on the courts. In United States v. Kelly the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals asserted that it preferred "to rest its
decision upon the general right of the authorities charged with the en-
forcement of the criminal law to employ fingerprinting as an appropriate
means to identify criminals and detect crime."'
2
The question of the admissibility of evidence obtained in a physical
examination 18 has been raised a number of times in the federal courts.
An analysis of the decisions in these cases reveals a logical outgrowth of
the doctrine laid down in the Holt decision. 14 In McFarland v. United
States 5 the defendant submitted to a physical examination pursuant to a
military order, and evidence was admitted showing that blood found on
his body indicated that he was the assailant in a rape and murder. The
court quite broadly stated that, "out of court as well as in court, his body
may be examined with or without his consent."'16 In United States v.
Nesmith1 7 defendant was indicted for manslaughter arising out of an
automobile accident. A motion to suppress evidence of a chemical analysis
of a urine specimen furnished by him at the direction of a law enforce-
ment officer to determine whether he was under the influence of alcohol
at the time of the accident was denied. After an analysis of the federal
cases in point, the court concluded that "the privilege against self-in-
crimination is limited to the giving of oral testimony. It does not extend
to the use of the defendant's body as physical or real evidence.""'
The conclusion reached in Nesmith was expanded, at least implicitly,
by the Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California,'9 a case dealing with
the use of blood tests. In Schmerber, a motion to exclude from evidence
an analysis of defendant's blood, taken over his objection shortly after
his arrest on drunken driving charges, was denied. Mr. Justice Brennan,
10. E.g., United States v. Iacullo, 226 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1955) ; People v. Jones,
112 Cal. App. 68, 296 Pac. 317 (1931) ; People v. Sallow, 100 Misc. 447, 165 N.Y.S.
915 (Gen. Sess. 1917) ; see UNIV'ORM RULES OF EVIDENcE 23(3), 25(b) ; MODEL CODE
oF EVIDENCE rule 205(a) (1942). See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1115 (1951);
2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 664 (12th ed. 1955) ; 8 WIGMORE §§ 2263, 2265.
11. E.g., United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932) ; State v. Rogers, 233
N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572 (1951). See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1115 (1953).
12. United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932).
13. See generally 8 WIGMORE § 2265; Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (1952).
14. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
15. 150 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
16. Id. at 594.
17. 121 F. Supp. 758 (D.D.C. 1954).
18. Id. at 762.
19. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
[VOL. 12
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after reaffirming the Court's holding in Boyd v. United States,20 asserted
that the Court, in admitting the blood test evidence, was not adopting as
an "ironbound rule" Professor Wigmore's contention that the privilege
against self-incrimination extends only to testimonial evidence elicited
through compulsion, and not to real or physical facts elicited in a like
manner :21
The distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways,
is that the privilege is a bar against compelling "communications" or
"testimony," but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused
the source of "real or physical evidence" does not violate it.
Although we agree that this distinction is a helpful framework
for analysis, we are not to be understood to agree with past applica-
tion in all instances.... In the present case, however, no such prob-
lem of application is presented. Not even a shadow of testimonial
compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused was
involved either in the extraction or in the chemical analysis. Peti-
tioner's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his
participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of
the test, which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone. Since
the blood test evidence, although an incriminating product of com-
pulsion, was neither petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to
some communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not
inadmissible on privelege grounds.
22
The Schmerber opinion raises immediate questions with regard to the
situations in which problems of application may arise in the lineup area,
and the rule of law that will be employed in arriving at solutions to these
problems.
While the Wigmore analysis of the fifth amendment has been gen-
erally accepted, its application has not been universal. A second interpre-
tation of the amendment draws the line "between enforced passivity on
the part of the accused and enforced activity on his part. Submission may
be compelled but not active cooperation, for then he is made 'to be a wit-
ness' or 'to give evidence'."'23 The practical effect of the varying inter-
pretations of the privilege against self-incrimination becomes evident
when the problems of compulsory 24 handwriting exemplars and the use
of voice exhibitions for identification purposes are considered.
25 If Wig-
20. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Compulsory production of one's private papers is the
same as compelling him to be a witness against himself.
21. The rule as stated by Wigmore is to the effect that "the privilege is limited
to testimonial disclosures. It was directed at the employment of legal process to
extract from the person's own lips an admission of guilt which would thus take the
place of other evidence." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 n.7 (1966)
(quoting 8 WIGMoRn § 2263).
22. Id. at 764.
23. MCCORMICK, EvIDCNCE § 126, at 265 (1954). See 4 JONzs, EVIDFNCE § 857
(5th ed. 1958) ; MAGUIR, EVID4NCt or GuiLT § 2.04 at 31 (1959).
24. No problem of self-incrimination arises when these forms of evidence are
given voluntarily or the privilege is considered to have been waived. See cases col-
lected in WIGMORt § 2265 nn.9 & 10.
25. For a more detailed examination of these two areas, see Weintraub, Voice
Identification, Writing Exemplars and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10
VAND. L. Rtv. 485 (1957); Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1322 (1948).
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more's dichotomy is employed, the conclusion is inevitable that handwrit-
ing is purely physical evidence. "It differs very little in principle from a
fingerprint impression secured by compulsion for purposes of comparison
with a fingerprint found at the scene of a crime. ' 26 The active-passive
rationale would lead to the conclusion that the individual has become active
and as such has been forced to participate in his own prosecution. This
analysis has been employed in the few decisions passing directly on the
constitutionality of compelling a person to execute a handwriting ex-
emplar.27 But no case has been found which categorically sanctions the
compulsion as constitutional. There are, however, a number of federal 28
and state29 decisions which infer that the evidence obtained would be
admissible. The Supreme Court in the Schmerber decision states that "both
federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection
against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measure-
ments, to write or speak for identification." 30 (Emphasis added.)
Application of these two different views of the extent of the privilege
to compulsory voice utterances for identification purposes leads to con-
clusions similar to those reached in their application to handwriting
exemplars. Under the Wigmore doctrine the utterance merely would be
a physical fact, while under the active-passive doctrine the statement would
be violative of the fifth amendment since the defendant has become active
in his own prosecution.
The use of voice identifications, however, presents several problems
which up to this point have not been at issue where handwriting exemplars
were involved. These problems are due in large part to the fact that,
historically, there has been a certain "magical air" surrounding incriminat-
ing evidence emanating from the spoken word which is not apparent when
other types of evidence are elicited from the accused. An examination of
the application of the privilege against self-incrimination reveals that its
initial purpose was to protect a citizen from incriminating himself through
testimonial oaths, and that vocal utterances by the defendant have been the
means of self-incrimination which have run deepest in opposition to the
fabric of the privilege.8 '
But while most courts would readily admit identifications based on
inane statements uttered by the accused, great difficulties have been en-
countered in securing the admission of an identification where the accused
has been compelled to speak the exact words used in the crime. The Texas
26. INBAU, StLF-INCRIMINATION, supra note 2, at 46.
27. United States v. Eggers, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 191, 11 C.M.R. 191 (1953) ; United
States v. Rosato, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 143, 11 C.M.R. 143 (1953) ; Beltran v. Samson and
Jose, 53 Phil. Is. 570 (1929).
28. E.g., United States v. Chibbaro, 361 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1966); Stanfield v.
United States, 350 F.2d 518 (10th Cir. 1965) ; Bryant v. United States 244 F.2d 411,
412 n.4 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 1953);
Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d 569, 586 (8th Cir. 1934).
29. E.g., People v. Matteson, 61 Cal. 2d 466, 393 P.2d 161, 39 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1964);
People v. Harper, 115 Cal. App. 2d 776, 252 P.2d 950 (1953).
30. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
31. See WIGMORS §§ 2250-51.
[VOL. 12
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and South Carolina courts, adopting the active-passive test, have held that
the privilege applies where the evidence, has been "produced by the
accused," while the New Jersey and New Mexico courts have chosen in
recent decisions to apply the Wigmore analysis and admit such evi-
dence.32 There have been no federal cases dealing directly with the con-
stitutionality of compulsory voice identification. The Supreme Court has
left the door open to either interpretation of the privilege (testimonial
compulsion and real or physical facts versus the active-passive distinc-
tion) in the Schmerber opinion by expressly refusing to accept Wigmore's
analysis in all circumstances,3 3 yet accepting it in the particular factual
situation presented.
Although there appears to be little difference between requiring the
exact words of the crime to be spoken (once it is assumed that compul-
sion to speak for identification is not a violation of the privilege) and
requiring the exact clothes worn by the perpetrator of the crime to be
worn in a physical exhibition by the defendant (once the compulsion to
exhibit has been found to be nonviolative), this difference in fact, when
coupled with employment of the active-passive distinction and the inherent
distaste of the fifth amendment for oral disclosures, may offer the Court
a cut-off point. While this result would not be in accord with the per-
vasive nature of the Schmerber opinion, it would be in line with the
liberal opinions of the Court in other areas of criminal procedure.
3 4
It is evident from the foregoing investigation that certain basic
criteria have been used by the courts in deciding what procedures and
evidentiary material fall within the protection of the fifth amendment
proscription against compulsory self-incrimination. Essentially, these
criteria are: (1) whether logically and historically the procedure is a
legitimate exercise by the police of their right and duty to investigate and
prosecute crime;35 and (2) whether the procedure merely compels the
defendant to convey real or physical evidence or employs testimonial com-
pulsion. In certain instances another line of decisions which distinguishes
between enforced passivity and activity on the part of the accused may be
employed.
B. Application of Fifth Amendment Standards
to the Lineup
When the standards that have evolved under the fifth amendment
are applied to certain specific practices which are, or may be, used during
a lineup, a sliding-scale type of analysis is inevitable. At one pole is the
32. Compare State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289 (1948), and Beachem
v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 272, 162 S.W.2d 706 (1942), with State v. King, 44 N.J. 346,
209 A.2d 110 (1965), and State v. Ramirez, 76 N.M. 72, 412 P.2d 246 (1966). See
also Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1322 (1948), and INBAU, supra note 26, at 42, 49.
33. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1966).
34. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964).
35. E.g., United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1932) ; Shaffer v. United
States, 24 App. D.C. 417, 426 (1904), cert. denied, 196 U.S. 639 (1905).
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practice of dressing the defendant in clothing similar or identical to that
used in the crime. Clothing may include anything from a mere shirt or
hat to the exact apparel allegedly worn by the assailant. It is submitted
that this practice is not within the protection of the privilege since it
could not be included in either of the prevailing interpretations. This is
because neither testimonial compulsion nor active participation is elicited.
Physical acts by the accused may include the mere assumption of a
position or particular pose, or the performance of some overt act which
would aid in the effort to either positively or negatively identify him as
the assailant. This type of act would be in the nature of a re-creation of
the acts of the crime. Since there is obviously no testimonial compulsion
evident in the former situation, it would be permissible under the Wig-
more approach. It may be argued, with probable success, that even under
the active-passive approach the accused could be made to submit to a
certain pose without his active participation. As overt physical acts are
compelled, the result tends to move toward the opposite pole. Compulsion
would be permissible under one analysis, the testimonial compulsion test,
and inadmissible under the other, since the defendant would be actively
participating in his own prosecution. However, in light of the Supreme
Court's approach to the use of blood tests in Schmerber, this type of
activity should receive judicial sanction as a proper investigative technique
without any trace of traditional testimonial compulsion.
A concluding area appears to come closest to the opposite pole. This
area involves compelling suspects to speak inane words or the exact words
used in the crime for purposes of identification. Evidence of identifica-
tion through the use of inane statements would probably be admissible,
even though it would be suppressed under the active-passive approach.
While the spoken word is closest to the protection afforded by the fifth
amendment, the inane statement lacks the characteristics which would
classify it as testimonial in nature.36 Furthermore, the practical necessity
of police identification when the assailant is heard but not seen is so over-
whelming as to make its exclusion almost unthinkable. A particularly
difficult problem arises where the accused is compelled to utter the exact
words used in the crime. The split of authority in the state courts and the
lack of any federal decision on this issue was previously noted, and the
Supreme Court's failure in Schmerber to adopt the Wigmore approach as
the applicable rule in all situations leaves its position in doubt. However,
it would seem that, in view of the Schmerber decision, exclusion would
have to be considered almost a reversal in approach, whereas the Court's
approval might be considered no more than the next logical step in this area.
36. Weintraub suggests that the privilege may only be invoked to protect state-
ments which an accused person is compelled to make, and upon which reliance is
placed concerning the veracity of the statement. In other words, only where the
accused is able to control the statement as a means of transmitting ideas. Where an
inane statement is elicited, reliance is not placed upon what the accused says, but
only that it is his normal voice, a fact which may be substantiated by other testimony.
Weintraub, supra note 25, at 508-09.
[VOL. 12
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Those who would press for approval of the procedure would assert
initially that there is no historical justification for exclusion of the identi-
fication. The privilege is a proscription against compelling a man to do
those things which a witness would traditionally do - to give oral testi-
mony as evidence of the facts stated and to produce documents and other
relevant objects in court. Since there is no reliance placed upon the
veracity of the defendant's statement, except with regard to his voice, there
is no testimony actually given; the oral statement is used only for identi-
fication purposes. The fact that the exact words are being used means
nothing in this context. Secondly, it would be argued that when the pro-
cedure used is examined in light of the underlying purpose of the priv-
ilege, there is again no reason for excluding it. The basic reason for
justifying the availability of the privilege to the accused is professed by
Wigmore:
The real objection is that any system of administration which per-
mits the prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure
as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby. The inclina-
tion develops to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied
with an incomplete investigation of the other sources . 7
The police are not compelling the defendant to make a self-disclosure of
any fact except that this is his voice. They have procured an independent
witness to identify him as the culprit or to identify his voice as that of the
culprit. No inclination has developed to rely on the defendant for evi-
dence of his guilt. Investigation has produced another source. Thirdly,
reference would be made to the fact that there is little or no difference
between compelling a man to wear the same clothes worn by the perpetra-
tor of the crime and compelling him to speak the same words that were
spoken in the crime. This type of analysis has been used by the courts to
justify compulsory fingerprints, physical examinations, and other like
procedures. Finally, it would be contended that this practice is necessary
in order for the police to carry out their primary obligation of apprehend-
ing lawbreakers. Without this practice, the police will be stymied in their
prosecution of many violent crimes, such as rape or armed robbery.
Those who would argue that the elimination of the use of the "exact
word identification" because it is contrary to the fifth amendment would
assert that the testimonial compulsion test is inherently vague38 and offers
no help at all in determining the applicability of the privilege in this situa-
tion. Application of this test, even if it is conceded to be valid in certain
areas, is not valid here. The courts have stretched Justice Holmes' analysis
of the privilege in Holt from the mere wearing of a blouse worn in a
37. 8 WIGMORt § 2251, at 309.
38. The vagueness of the testimonial compulsion test is evident from the state-
ment that compulsion occurs where the person asserting the privilege is proceeded
against by a "form of process treating him as a witness (i.e., as a person appearing
before the tribunal to furnish testimony in his moral responsibility for truth tell-
ing) . . ." or where "he would be at any time liable to make oath to the ... authenticity
or origin of the articles produced." 8 WIGMOR& § 2264, at 363.
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crime to such far-removed areas as bloodtesting and physical examina-
tions of the accused's body. The extention of this conservative analysis
of the privilege against self-incrimination is completely inconsistent with
the present liberal philosophy of protecting the individual's rights during
the criminal process. Underlying this argument would be the contention
that it is impossible to validly justify the use of the exact words of the
crime for identification purposes when mere inane statements would serve
the same purpose. To argue that the witness is not able to make an
accurate identification unless the exact words are used raises a serious
question as to the witness' ability to make a valid identification at all.
Most crimes which are adaptable to this type of identification procedure
are of the face-to-face variety which involve either a show of force or
the use of actual force and, therefore, are crimes which involve a great
deal of emotional strain on the victim. To re-create this emotional strain
in the mind of the victim would hamper his ability to make an objective
identification and seriously prejudice the entire procedure against the
defendant.89
IV. THE LINEUP AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The accused's right to counsel at a given time, and his right to have
counsel retained for him where he is indigent, has been greatly expanded
during the past six years ;40 but there has not been a single Supreme Court
decision dealing with the right of the accused to have counsel present at
a lineup. In July of this year, however, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Gilbert v. California,41 a case concerned in part with whether
the accused's right to counsel was violated when he was compelled to
appear without benefit of counsel at a lineup which resulted in his identi-
fication by eyewitnesses who were shown unlawfully seized photographs
of the defendant prior to their attendance at the lineup. In all probability,
a decision of the Court with regard to the sixth amendment implications
of the lineup will be shortly forthcoming.
Prior to 1963 there was no federally protected right to counsel in
state prosecutions. In that year the Supreme Court held in Gideon v.
Wainwright42 that the sixth amendment applied to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As a consequence of
Gideon, the federal decisions relevant to the time at which a right to
39. It is admitted that this argument is not constitutional but evidentiary in nature,
tending to relate only to the weight of the evidence. It is included because it is felt
that it is a practical problem the Supreme Court would consider.
40. For treatment of the historical development, see Enker & Elsen, Counsel for
the Suspect, 49 MINN. L. Rev. 47, 49 (1964); Herman, The Supreme Court and
Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIo ST. L.J. 449, 481 (1964) ; Developments
in the Law - Confessions, 79 HARV. L. Riv. 935, 996 (1966).
41. 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965), cert. granted sub noma.
Gilbert v. California, 384 U.S. 985 (1966).
42. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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counsel accrues were also made applicable to the states. Under one line
of cases a right to counsel exists at pre-trial arraignments where a pro-
tected right may be lost due to the accused's unawareness of certain
procedural rules,43 and at pre-trial hearings before a judicial officer where
statements may be made that can be admitted at trial.4 4 Another line of
cases has extended the right to counsel to situations in which investigative
techniques of the police are at issue. In Massiah v. United States45 the
Supreme Court declared that eliciting incriminating statements from a
defendant after indictment without the presence of counsel is violative
of the sixth amendment. Escobedo v. Illinois46 extended the rationale of
Massiah to the point at which police investigation takes on an accusatorial
focus directed at eliciting incriminating statements from the accused. In
Miranda v. Arizona,47 decided in June of this year, the Supreme Court
attempted to set out categorically the scope of right to counsel at the pre-
trial stage.
In Miranda, the Court focused on the right to counsel as a device to
insure a free and intelligent exercise of one's fifth amendment right to
remain silent:
The prosecutor may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self incrimination . . . prior to any ques-
tioning ... [T]he person must be warned that he has a right to re-
main silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to presence of an attorney either
retained or appointed
s.4
Following this rationale, a lineup procedure that merely requires the
accused to stand in front of certain witnesses would not come within the
Miranda decision, unless the accused's privilege against self-incrimination
were violated.4 9 Previous analysis indicates that participation in the lineup
to this extent, even though by compulsion, is not violative of the fifth
amendment. 50 A claim of a right to counsel in this instance would there-
fore be unfounded.
The use of voice identifications in connection with the lineup, how-
ever, presents a question closer to the scope of Miranda. In People v.
Juarez51 the California Court of Appeals dealt with the validity of the
use of a voice identification during a lineup in light of Miranda and
43. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). The Court held that where a
defense could be waived if not raised at an arraignment, a right to counsel existed.
44. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam).
45. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
46. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
47. Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
48. Id. at 444.
49. Gilbert v. United States, 35 U.S.L. WUK 2170 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 1966).
50. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
51. 52 Cal. Rptr. 556 (D.C. App. 1966).
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Schmerber.5 2 The court, adopting the traditional analysis of the fifth
amendment privilege,5 3 equated voice identifications to the use of writing
exemplars and concluded that no fifth amendment rights had been im-
paired. No distinction was made in Juarez between inane statements and
the exact words spoken by the perpetrator of the crime. Granting the fact
that there is no process of "interrogation" involved in compelling the
accused to say the words of the crime, the question of whether this type
of investigative conduct transcends the rationale of identification and
enters into the area protected by the fifth amendment must be considered.
If the Court were to make a distinction based on the character of words
the accused is requested to speak, a right of counsel would accrue since
a fifth amendment right would be at stake.
There are practical reasons for having counsel present at a lineup,
aside from the constitutional issues presented. Since the identification
will eventually be introduced into evidence, the reliability of the identifica-
tion will be of prime importance. If the accused has counsel present at
the lineup, counsel can take steps to make certain the lineup is conducted
in a manner that is fundamentally fair to the accused. For example,
counsel could probably act to correct a gross lack of similarity between
the accused and the other parties in the lineup, or to prevent the police
from pointing out the accused to the witness prior to the lineup. No con-
crete reason can be advanced for denying counsel permission to be present,
and his presence will serve to attest to the fairness and integrity of the
lineup as practiced in a particular jurisdiction.
V. ILLEGAL ARREST AND THE EVIDENTIARY FRUITS
OF THE POLICE LINEUP
A. The Problem
In considering the fourth amendment's relationship to the lineup, a
hypothetical will be employed to aid in the visualization of the initial prob-
lems presented.
A robbery of a liquor store was committed in the early hours of the
morning on July 4, 1966. The culprit escaped leaving the liquor store
owner bound. Investigation at the scene of the crime turned up no real
clues, but a screening of police files revealed eight possible suspects who
had a modus operandi similar to that employed in the robbery. The local
area was canvassed, and four of the eight were located and brought to
the station house. No other evidence against any of the four existed, and
it is assumed their arrest lacked probable cause. A lineup was held and a
positive identification made. On the basis of this identification, the police
obtained a search warrant from the local magistrate. The home of the
accused was searched and the money taken was recovered.
52. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
53. See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
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Three basic issues arise:
1. Can the victim testify at the trial with regard to the lineup
identification ?
2. Can the victim make an in-court identification?
3. Can the stolen money be introduced into evidence at the trial?
B. The Rights of the Accused Under
the Fourth Amendment
Citizens of the United States were initially protected from federal
intrusions into their privacy by the fourth amendment.5 4 However, it
was not until 1914 in Weeks v. United States55 that the Supreme Court,
acting in its supervisory capacity over the federal courts, initiated an
exclusionary rule of evidence as an attempt to insure the effectuation
of this right. The states, on the other hand, were not considered bound
by the fourth amendment until the Court's decision in Wolf v. Colorado56
in 1949. But while Wolf held that the fourth amendment was appli-
cable to the states, it did not result in the adoption of the exclusionary
rule. The Court concluded that only the basic right was within the concept
of "ordered liberty" and applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The parallel to Weeks in the federal
genesis occurred in Mapp v. Ohio57 where the Court reconsidered Wolf,
and held that the exclusionary rule was part and parcel of the fourth
amendment and should be applied in state prosecutions. In Ker v. Cal-
ifornia5 8 it was held that, in determining violations of the fourth amend-
ment, the states would be required to meet minimum federal standards.
Justice Clark writing for the majority in Mapp set out the fundamental
reason for incorporating the exclusionary rule into the fourth amendment
guarantee:
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance
against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form
of words," valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual char-
ter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the free-
dom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high
regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""9
54. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
55. 235 U.S. 695 (1914).
56. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
57. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
58. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
59. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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But while protection of the right of privacy is the ultimate purpose
of the exclusionary rule, several more precise reasons have been posited
as underlying bases :60
1. Providing the victim of a violation of the fourth amendment with
an adequate remedy;
2. Preventing a governmental police branch from profiting, by way
of conviction, from its illegal conduct;
3. Preserving the integrity of the judicial processes; and
4. Serving as a deterrent to future illegal conduct by the police.
Almost immediately following the adoption of the exclusionary rule
at the federal level in Weeks, the Court was faced with the problem of
defining the scope of the rule. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States,61 Mr. Justice Holmes asserted that "the essence of the provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used, but that it shall not be used at
all."'62 Not only the direct products of action violative of the fourth
amendment would be excluded, but indirect evidentiary fruits as well.
Verbal statements had not been subject to exclusion on fourth amend-
ment grounds until Wong Sun v. United States.63 In that case the ex-
clusionary rule was applied to certain statements and to real evidence
related in a "but for" manner to the illegal arrest. The Court in determin-
ing what evidence should be excluded, adopted a test espoused by Professor
Maguire: "The more apt question in such a case is whether, granting an
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objec-
60. Alien, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and Civil Libcrties,
44 ILL. L. REv. 1, 16-30 (1951) ; Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contem-
poraneous Incriminating Statements: A Neglected Area of the Criminal Procedure, 1961
U. ILL. L.F. 78, 92; Paulson, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by Police, 52 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 255 (1961) ; Comment, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 1159, 1164-70 (1961).
61. 251 U.S. 390 (1920).
62. Id. at 392.
63. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). There has been a great deal of controversy with regard
to whether Wong Sun rests on fourth amendment grounds. Some courts, seizing on
the oppressive circumstances under which the statements were made, have inter-
preted Wong Sun to be an application of the coerced confession rule of the four-
teenth amendment. Dailey v. State, 239 Md. 596, 212 A.2d 257 (1965). Other courts
have held that Wong Sun rests on fourth amendment grounds, and apply the ex-
clusionary rule even where no oppressive circumstances are found. People v. Haven,
59 Cal. 2d 713, 381 P.2d 927, 31 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1963).
Granting that Wong Sun rests on fourth amendment grounds, a question still
exists as to whether it is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, or is merely based on the supervisory power of the Supreme
Court over the federal courts. In light of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), which
made the fourth amendment applicable to the states in toto, it appears that Wong Sun
would also be binding on the states. The Supreme Court indicated the correctness of
this position in Traub v. Connecticut, 374 U.S. 493 (1963) (per curiam), when it
vacated judgment in a state search and seizure case and remanded the case for recon-
sideration in light of Wong Sun and Ker.
See for an analysis of this question: Broeder, Wong Sun v. United States: A
Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NVB. L. Rev. 485, 557 (1963) ; Herman, The Supreme
Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIo ST. L.J. 449, 459 (1964).
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tion is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
'6 4
The test adopted in Wong Sun is designed to exclude direct and in-
direct fruits of the illegal conduct, in order to effectuate the primary pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule - deterrence. The test does not result in
the exclusion of all evidence related in a but for manner to the illegality,
but is only applied where a deterrent effect will be realized. The Court has
recognized that exclusion will be ineffective in two instances. If the prose-
cution can prove that the evidence was or would have been discovered
by independent sources, it will be admissible. 65 Furthermore, where the
evidence is so attenuated in causal relation from the initial violation as
to be considered free of the original taint of illegality, the rule will not be
applied. 6 In order to adequately deter, a remedy must make violation of
the rule an undesirable course of conduct. To limit the rule to direct evi-
dentiary products of an illegal arrest or search would fail to adequately
deter illegal police conduct. Indirect evidence can be of equal value or,
in some cases, of even greater value than the initial fruits of the illegality.
Therefore, if the exclusionary rule were limited to direct products its
effect would be minimized, if not negated.
C. The Fourth Amendment and the Lineup
The contentions of the defendant in the above hypothetical, in attempt-
ing to secure the exclusion of the lineup identification, would be based
on an application of the exclusionary rule not yet considered by the
Supreme Court. Prior precedent has focused on the exclusion of real
evidence, verbal statements and evidentiary fruits resulting from an illegal
search or arrest. A lineup presents a unique circumstance in that neither
real evidence nor verbal statements of the accused are the immediate re-
sult of the illegality. Rather, the identification of the accused by a witness
or a victim results. Application of the exclusionary rule to the lineup
situation will be viewed in light of the rationale of the rule, its social
consequences, and the remedial steps which might be utilized to avoid
the problem.
The California Court of Appeals recently considered a case similar
to the hypothetical presented above in People v. Watson.67 The court
focused on the exploitation test of Wong Sun 8 in holding that testimony
relevant to a lineup conducted after an illegal arrest should not be ex-
cluded. Crucial to the court's decision was the fact that the arrest was
made in good faith and that the lineup did not amount to an exploitation
64. Id. at 488 (quoting MACUIRF, op. cit. supra note 23, § 5:07 at 221).
65. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963) ; Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (dicta).
66. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) ; Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (dicta).
67. 234 Cal. App. 203, 44 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1965).
68. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
COMMENTS
15
Byrne et al.: Constitutional Ramifications of the Police Lineup
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1966
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
of the illegal arrest. The Watson interpretation of the exploitation test
appears to be based on the subjective intent of the arresting officers rather
than the position of the accused in the lineup situation. The court did
infer, however, that if the test were applicable, exclusion would be the
appropriate remedy.
In Gatlin v. United States,609 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals considered the admissibility of a lineup identification obtained sub-
sequent to an illegal arrest. The court held that a sufficient link existed
between the illegality and the evidence sought to be introduced, and ex-
cluded testimony relevant to the lineup on the basis of Wong Sun. But
while the Watson and Gatlin courts agree that the exclusionary rule should
apply if exploitation of the illegal arrest is found, they differ in their
concept of that standard. The Gatlin court used the interpretation most
in line with the purposes of the rule and its underlying rationale by seeing
a need for a deterrent to protect the fourth amendment rights of the
individual in the situation presented. The Watson decision, on the other
hand, turned on the idea that good faith illegal police conduct cannot be
deterred. This view disregards the deterrent effect accomplished by re-
quiring police to weigh more heavily the rights guaranteed a suspect by
the fourth amendment.
In State v. Hodgson70 the Supreme Court of New Jersey dealt hypo-
thetically with the consequences of a lineup identification following an
illegal arrest. The court, noting that the defendant had been in custody
for twelve hours prior to the lineup, concluded "that the link between any
illegality in the arrest and the later evidence was so attenuated that it can not
serve to taint the evidence." 71 This application of the attenuation concept
was based primarily on the lack of relation between the illegal arrest and the
lineup identification in point of time. In this respect, the court's conclusions
are unjustified. To allow a mere interim of hours to be dispositive in the
denial of the application of the exclusionary rule is paying mere lip service to
the rule. A pertinent point must be kept in mind - there is no issue with
regard to the voluntariness or involuntariness of the accused in the lineup
situation. An arrestee is forced to participate in a lineup, and a mere passing
of hours in no way lessens the relationship between illegal police conduct
and the lineup identification. Furthermore, the effect of an illegal arrest
becomes more aggravated, rather than lessened, as detention continues.
In Payne v. United States72 an issue was raised with regard to
whether a trial court73 had erred in failing to sustain a motion to bar an
in-court identification obtained as a result of a lineup. The lineup had
been conducted while the accused was in custody in violation of rule 5(a)
69. Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
70. 44 N.J. 151, 207 A.2d 542 (1965).
71. Id. at 156, 207 A.2d at 545.
72. 294 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 883 (1961).
73. The lower court excluded testimony relevant to the actual lineup identifica-
tion, but allowed the in-court identification.
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of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 4 Circuit Judge Washington,
speaking for the full court, affirmed the trial court's decision: "The conse-
quence of accepting the appellants contention in the present situation
would be that Warren (the identifying witness) would be forever pre-
cluded from testifying against Payne .... Such a result is unthinkable." 75
There is a clear distinction between the situation in Payne and that pre-
sented by an illegal arrest. The Payne court went to great lengths to
emphasize the fact that the arrest of the accused was constitutional, even
though rule 5(a) had been violated. Rule 5(a) is designed to bring a
suspect before a magistrate as soon as reasonably possible in order to
insure the protection of his fifth amendment rights; however, in the
illegal arrest case, there is a violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused ab initio. Payne, when viewed on its facts, has no relevence on
the illegal arrest situation, even though the Hodgson and Watson courts
treated it as a proper precedent in the area.
The Supreme Court has not faced a situation similar to that posed
in the hypothetical, and the existing case law seems to be at odds. Some
cases draw on the liberal philosophy and ideals of the cases in analogous
areas, while others seek to limit cases to their facts and find in favor of
the prosecution. The Supreme Court, in considering the lineup as it
relates to the fourth amendment, will not be faced with precedent cate-
gorically demanding a given decision. Rather, it will be in the position
of weighing the conflicting interests of the police, the individual, and
society as a whole.
D. How Would the Supreme Court Decide?
1. Admission of a Lineup Identification Obtained Subsequent to an
Illegal Arrest.76 - It would appear that, if the rationale of prior Supreme
74. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 (a):
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon complaint or any
person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without
unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any other
nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the
laws of the United States....
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 323 (1943), and Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1957), have made the exclusionary rule the remedy for violations of this rule.
75. Payne v. United States, 294 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 883 (1961).
76. The following analysis is based on the constitutional challenge to the intro-
duction of testimony relevant to the lineup after an illegal arrest. It should be noted,
however, that the hearsay rule will generally exclude prior consistent statements that
are made out of court. Prior consistent statements will be admitted only to cor-
roborate the in-court identification of a witness whose reliability has been challenged.
When such evidence is admitted, there is a diversity as to whether the jury may con-
sider it only on the issue of credibility, or whether it can also be considered as sub-
stantive evidence. 4 WIcMORS §§ 1130, 1134 (3d ed. 1940).
Some state courts have recently taken the situation presented from under the
hearsay rule, because they feel the hearsay dangers do not exist where prior con-
sistent statements are offered in evidence. In these jurisdictions, the testimony may
be admitted as substantive evidence, notwithstanding the fact that it is not intro-
duced to corroborate an in-court identification. People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621,
354 P.2d 865, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1960).
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Court decisions in the fourth amendment area were applied to a situation
in which a lineup identification is made subsequent to an illegal arrest,
and evidence of this sought to be introduced at trial, it should be excluded.
Yet a decision of this kind would have serious social ramifications, since
it would curtail the use of a police practice generally considered legiti-
mate. One possible basis for the denial of a motion to exclude would
involve the adoption of an approach similar to that taken in Smith v.
United States.7 7 In that case a confession, and real evidence resulting
from it, were excluded as a violation of rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, but the court refused to exclude the testimony
of a witness found as a result of the confession, asserting that the testi-
mony represented the free choice of an independent actor. A similar
argument might be made with regard to the lineup. However, Watson
7
1
by inference, Gatlin7 9 on its holding, and the lower court opinion in
Payne"° give strength to the view that if an exploitation of an illegal arrest
is found, the testimony should be excluded. Furthermore, there is a
critical distinction between the nature of the illegality in Smith and the
fact that there is an ab initio constitutional violation presented by an illegal
arrest.
In light of the constitutional violation does the rationale of the ex-
clusionary rule demand exclusion? Some deterrent is certainly required
to discourage the use of "dragnet" procedures by the police. Even if there
is a good faith arrest, there is a need to deter police from making rash
arrests which interfere with an individual's fourth amendment rights
to the same extent as the "dragnet." To permit the police to profit from
their illegal conduct would seem contrary to the rationale of the cases.
If the exclusionary rule is not applied, the accused has no adequate remedy.
Finally, the judiciary, by not excluding such evidence, would be in fact
sanctioning the violation.
There are ample grounds on which to conclude that the exclusionary
rule should be applied to a lineup conducted subsequent to an illegal
arrest. Whether there are grounds for distinguishing prior precedents
favoring this conclusion is debatable. The question more appropriately is
whether there is any adequate reason to attempt to make such a distinction.
2. Admission of In-Court Identifications Made by Witnesses Who
Have Made Initial Identifications at Lineups Subsequent to an Illegal
Arrest. - At first impression, most persons would react similarly to Judge
Washington in the Payne case when he asserted that not permitting wit-
nesses who have made lineup identifications to repeat these identifications
77. 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
78. People v. Watson, 234 Cal. App. 203, 44 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1965).
79. Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
80. Payne v. United States, 294 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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in court would be unthinkable.8 ' However, reflection on the matter will
lead to a less dogmatic, and perhaps even contrary conclusion. A most
serious problem is presented by the admission of an in-court identifica-
tion where the initial lineup identification was unconstitutional. In People
v. Watson8 2 the court did not rule on the exclusion of the lineup identi-
fication because the in-court identification was so condemning that exclu-
sion of testimony relevent to the lineup was of no real consequence. Obvi-
ously, if the exclusionary rule is to have an effect in this situation, it
must apply to in-court testimony as well as testimony regarding the lineup
identification. To exclude one and not the other is merely a token act.
Police in a difficult case could concede the loss of the lineup testimony to
reap the harvest of the in-court identification.
Of course, this seems a remedy even more harsh than that criticized
by then Judge Cardozo in People v. Defore8 3 when he stated that, "the
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." But the
criminal goes free only to insure a higher value - the right of privacy.
Is this result any more stark than the exclusion of a trustworthy con-
fession obtained after a legal arrest, as dictated by Miranda v. Arizona?"4
The total bar with regard to identification evidence would adequately
deter illicit police conduct, insure an adequate remedy for the accused,
and protect the integrity of the judiciary.
3. Admission of Real Evidence Seized Under a Valid Search War-
rant Obtained as a Result of a Lineup Conducted Subsequent to an
Illegal Arrest. - In our hypothetical defendant's arrest lacked probable
cause and was based merely on suspicion. By illegally arresting the de-
fendant and forcing him to participate in a lineup, the police acquired
grounds for the search warrant. Is this not a most direct exploitation of
the illegal arrest since the real evidence they seek pursuant to the warrant
is almost assured to provide the basis for conviction? Could the Court
deny the application of the exclusionary rule?
No search of the defendant's house could have been conducted prior
to the illegal arrest. What in the interim could so attenuate this real evi-
dence so as to make it admissible? No independent source is involved and
the causal relation is direct. Again the deterrent rationale seems clearly
to demand exclusion. To admit this evidence might encourage the police,
in a given case, to give up the testimony of the witness for the real evi-
dence. Our Constitution and its demands are not to be employed in a
chess match where the police give up a knight to capture a queen. The
law is clear - obey the fourth amendment. Is this too great a burden
for the police to shoulder?
81. Id. at 727.
82. People v. Watson, 234 Cal. App. 203, 44 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1965).
83. 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
84. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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E. The Effect
It is easy to see why public reaction to an actual case similar to our
hypothetical would be adamantly contrary. How blatant could a crime be?
Yet the victim is precluded from testifying in court, and the money ob-
tained pursuant to the search cannot be introduced at trial since the arrest
of the accused was illegal. Society is indeed paying a heavy price.
A sanction, however, must be commensurate to and weighed against
the right it is designed to protect and the means available to insure its
protection. Because the right to privacy has a close association with the
fundamental liberty of the person, it ranks as a most noble right. Grant-
ing the necessity of society to protect itself from the criminal, there lies
a prior necessity in the protection of the individual citizen from unauthor-
ized extensions of police authority. When squarely faced, all the rule does
is to provide a deterrent sanction for violations of the law. This is not
an overbearing duty to place on government officials in view of the fact
that it is their sworn duty to aid in insuring this exact result.
Much of the initial distaste brought about by the application of the
fourth amendment and its sanctions to the lineup situation can be dis-
pelled by reflection on what steps could be taken by police to prevent im-
position of the exclusionary rule. The "dragnet" is clearly an illegal prac-
tice that should not be allowed and, therefore, the resulting exclusion of
all the evidence is warranted. In the good faith arrest situations, the
adoption of a rule similar to the McNabb-Malory"5 rule would insure
the validity of the lineup and its products. A magistrate would certify
that probable cause existed, thereby eliminating the possible consequence
of later exclusion. All that would be required is that the lineup be delayed
a short period of time in order to have this ruling made. This procedure
would protect the rights of the individual as well as the interests of the
police and society.
VI. THE LINEUP AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In Philadelphia, when persons indicted for criminal offenses cannot
make bail they are committed to the Philadelphia Prisons Detention Center
to await trial. These persons are sometimes suspected of having com-
mitted unsolved crimes which are totally distinct from the offenses for
which they were indicted. In these circumstances, if there are witnesses
to the crime who may be able to identify the culprit, the police arrange a
lineup. The use of the lineup in these cases may involve serious legal
problems, for if the suspect had been able to make bail, he could not be
forced to take part in such a lineup unless the police actually arrested
him for the unsolved crime. What will be the constitutional effect of the
85. See note 74 supra.
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police placing a non-bail suspect in a lineup where reasonable grounds
for his arrest do not exist, and he could not be taken into custody and
placed in the lineup if he were free on bail?
On occasion, suspects in custody have objected to being forced to
take part in lineup procedures. In 1964 two suspects brought an action
in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to enjoin
the police from placing them in a lineup.86 Judge Freedman, then District
Judge, granted a temporary injunction, finding that a compulsory lineup
of the unbailed suspect would amount "to a material distinction between
those who enter bail and those - equally presumed to be innocent - who
do not,"87 and that there was "substantial merit"88 in the claim that plac-
ing these suspects in lineups would constitute an invidious discrimination
depriving them of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment.8 9 However, in 1965, when a number of suspects,
in custody under the same circumstances, brought similar actions to en-
join the police from placing them in lineups, District Judge Luongo denied
injunctive relief, 90 holding that the discrimination against non-'bail sus-
pects was not an invidious discrimination in the constitutional sense,91
since it had for its basis a reasonable classification, "the classification of
jail versus bail." 92 Pointing out that the eighth amendment provides for
such a classification of criminal suspects, Judge Luongo argued that those
in one class - confinement - are discriminated against in many ways:
"Confinement carries with it a suspension of or a restriction upon the
exercise of most of the rights of free men, not the least of which is
liberty itself. ' 93 In June of 1965, in Rigney v. Hendrick,94 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decisions of
Judge Luongo:
Admittedly, there is a classification between those who can and those
who cannot make bail. The Constitution, however, permits such a
classification, and any differences here, arise solely because of the
inherent characteristics of confinement and cannot constitute invidious
discrimination.95
86. Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
87. Id. at 567.
88. Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565, 568 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
89. Plaintiffs had been freed on bail when the case came up for final hearing.
The defendants there assured the court that if the plaintiffs ever again came into the
custody of the authorities, they would be allowed to communicate with counsel and
seek injunctive relief before being placed into a lineup. Judge Freedman held that
the threat of the lineup was too remote and indefinite and denied the final injunction.
Butler v. Crumlish, 237 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa. 1964). Thus he did not not actually
decide the constitutional question.
90. Rigney v. Hendrick, Civil No. 37791 (E.D. Pa., April 7, 1965) ; Johnson v.
Hendrick, Civil No. 37657 (E.D. Pa., April 14, 1965) ; Morris v. Crumlish, 239 F.
Supp. 498 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
91. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963).
92. Morris v. Crumlish, 239 F. Supp. 498, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
93. Ibid.
94. 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 975 (1966). The question
had become moot, since Rigney, the petitioner, had been released on bail.
95. Id. at 715. On petition for rehearing, five judges voted against, and three
voted for a rehearing en banc, and the petition was denied.
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The concept that there is a boundary about each individual's private
life, beyond which neither the state nor other individuals may freely
enter, is so basic that many of our specific guarantees of liberty spring
from it. "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police . . . is basic to a free society, [and] . . . implicit in 'the concept of
ordered liberty'." 96 In Pennsylvania, the police may arrest a person with-
out a warrant only if the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that a felony has been committed and that the person he contem-
plates arresting is the felon.9 7 The bailed suspect, therefore, is protected
against police interference with his privacy by this concept of reasonable-
ness, since short of an actual arrest he cannot be placed in a lineup against
his will. The suspect who is held in the custody of the authorities with-
out bail should receive no less protection. If a man is forced to take part
in a lineup because he is within the control of the authorities, when an-
other suspect, identical in every way except in wealth, can avoid the
lineup because of his ability to post bail, an invidious 98 discrimination
exists in the sense of the equal protection clause. Whether or not this is
the law is not at all clear from the opinion of the Court of Appeals in
Rigney.
Rigney v. Hendrick99 was a consolidation of the appeals of six in-
digent suspects who, while in custody at the Detention Center in Phil-
adelphia, were placed in lineups for crimes distinct from those for which
they were being held. The majority of the court singled out the facts
pertinent to one appellant, Roosevelt Morris,100 saying that the facts were
substantially the same in all the cases, and briefly sketched enough key
facts to show that there were reasonable grounds for an arrest of that
suspect.'0 ' By taking this approach, the court averted the problem of de-
ciding the constitutionality of a lineup of a suspect in the absence of
probable cause.
In his dissent from the majority's denial of the petition for rehear-
ing, Judge Freedman argued incisively that if there were no problem of
a lack of probable cause, "since the appellants conceded that a police
lineup would be permissible if they had been arrested on the new charges,
their contention amounted to no more than an insistence on the formality
of a new arrest to obtain custody over a defendant who had already been
96. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
97. See note, 100 U. PA. L. Riv. 1182 (1952) for a detailed review of the cases.
98. The MERRIAM-WEBSTER NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1959)
defines "invidious" as something "unjustly and irritatingly discriminating."
99. Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
975 (1966).
100. This was the only opinion which was reported below. See Morris v. Crumlish,
239 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
101. Morris was awaiting trial for burglary and other related offenses. After his
indictment, the victim of a burglary and rape not connected with the crimes included in
the indictment, identified some items, which were discovered in Morris' possession at
the time of his arrest, as her property. In addition, the suspect's modus operandi was
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arrested on an earlier offense and was then in confinement because of
his inability to furnish bail. '10 2 Furthermore, Rigney, the only appellant
who petitioned the court for a rehearing, claimed in his petition that the
police had no probable cause for arresting him for the lineup-connected
offense.
103
The inequalities involved in making a distinction between bailed and
unbailed suspects in the lineup situation cannot be excused by relating it
to the permissible classification. That classification sanctions its legitimate
progeny, and they are many. Fundamental freedoms may be cut off by
the necessities of prison life, but only when this result is the unavoidable
consequence of that life. The administration of a penal institution in no
way necessitates the lineup of suspects who are held in that institution
solely because they are unable to make bail.
VII. THE LINEUP AS A PRODUCT OF POLICE COERCION
There are two related patterns of argument which challenge the
basic constitutionality of police lineups. On one hand, it can be argued
that the fact that a suspect must stand, speak, or assume a stance compels
him to be a witness against himself. It is a different question, however,
to ask whether the fact that his participation is the product of coercion
makes this such an impermissible police activity as to clash with our basic
concepts of ordered liberty 10 4 and result in a violation of the due process
clause. Judge Freedman, dissenting in Rigney v. Hendrick,1° 5 argued
that the court should "examine the due process of law contention that
all lineups are unconstitutional in any event because they coerce the de-
fendant into an involuntary participation in his criminal prosecution.' u0 6
The United States Supreme Court, in Roch'in v. California,10 7 de-
veloped the principle that the very character of police behavior, of
"methods too close to the rack and the screw,"' 08 could taint even so-
called "real evidence," 09 forcing its exclusion. In that case, law enforce-
ment officers first "jumped upon" the accused and tried physically to
remove morphine capsules from his mouth. When these efforts proved
unsuccessful, an emetic solution was forced into the accused's stomach.
The Court, finding the conduct of the officers so extreme as to shock the
conscience, held that the due process clause had been violated and that
the evidence obtained was inadmissible. Critical to a proper evaluation of
Rochin is the fact that the police officers violated the fourth amendment
by unlawfully breaking into and entering defendant's room. 110 But had
102. Id. at 716.
103. Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710, 719 (3d Cir. 1965).
104. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
105. Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965).
106. Id. at 718.
107. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
108. Id. at 172.
109. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 166 (1952).
110. People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 143, 225 P.2d 1, 3 (1950).
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Rochin been treated as simply a garden variety search and seizure case,
the federal policy of exclusion would not have been carried over against
the state through the fourteenth amendment."' The rationale of coercion
was the new ingredient which set Rochin apart, and resulted in the ex-
clusionary rule being applied to a state prosecution in a narrow circum-
stance.
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Rochin should not be exag-
gerated beyond its proper factual framework, however. The police had
so overstepped their rightful authority in that case that the Court found
their conduct shocking to its conscience. In Schmerber v. California"2 the
Court implicitly recognized that, in instances of legitimate investigative
work, the police have a clear right to use coercion within reasonable limits.
In that case a police officer ordered a blood sample extracted from a
suspect against his will. While recognizing that the evidence was the
product of compulsion, the Court nevertheless held it to be admissible in
a trial for the offense of driving while intoxicated.
Realistically, any right of the police would become meaningless if,
merely by resisting, any suspect could choke off that right with an argu-
ment based upon coercion. If the police may take a sample of blood in
a proper case, they must have the authority to compel the taking. Simi-
larly, the lineup necessarily involves an element of compulsion. In Phil-
adelphia, for example, while prison authorities will not physically com-
pel a suspect to appear at a post commitment lineup," 8 the threat of soli-
tary confinement - the key to enforcing the order of the day in general
prison life - is utilized to "encourage" prisoners to participate. The
fact that pressures are brought to bear on suspects should not, in and of
itself, make the whole lineup procedure unconstitutional, where the pres-
sures employed are fair and reasonable in relation to the social useful-
ness of the lineup.
VIII. A MODEL LINEUP PROCEDURE
In order to avoid the possible consequences of the foregoing discus-
sion, a model lineup procedure is submitted which is clearly within the
various constitutional guarantees involved. Additional suggestions are in-
corporated to insure the maximum reliability of a witness identification.
1. All accused persons should be brought before a magistrate for a
judicial determination of probable cause prior to being placed in a lineup.
2. Once in a lineup, the accused should be requested to recite only
inane words. (For example, the police may ask the accused to read from
the sports page of a local newspaper.) No request should be made to
111. The key case was still Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
112. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
113. See Testimony of E. J. Hendrick, Superintendent of the Philadelphia Deten-
tion Center, Record, Rigney v. Hendrick, Civil No. 37791 (E.D. Pa., April 7, 1965).
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speak the words allegedly said by the culprit at the time of the crime. No
questioning should be done unless counsel is present or a valid waiver
has been made.
3. The utmost effort should be made to have persons of similar
characteristics in the lineup. Prior to the lineup the accused should not
be identified as the person arrested for the crime. Both of these measures
are designed to result in a reliable identification that would be as effective
as possible at trial.
4. If possible, counsel should be present. A photograph of the lineup
should be taken for submission to the jury as evidence of the reliability
of the witnesses' identification.
5. If the accused is held after bail is set because of his indigency,
no lineup should be held for other crimes unless sufficient evidence exists
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